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Abstract
Academic literature and the media offer a variety of monikers for emerging states like Brazil, India and 
China, most prominently, ‘emerging powers’ and ‘emerging markets’. This article argues the terms 
used to describe these states create assumptions about their behaviour in global governance (GG). In 
order to accurately assess the impact of emerging states on international institutions, it is necessary to 
more systematically examine their current participation in GG. Does the use of power and economic 
interests in GG negotiations distinguish emerging states from traditional powers, as the ‘emerging’ part 
of these terms suggests? And can the content of GG negotiations predict the dominance of each factor, 
as implied by the ‘power/market’ part? This article tackles these questions by comparing the behav-
iour of one emerging state (India) and one traditional power (the United States) in negotiations at the 
World Trade Organisation and the United Nations Security Council. The results demonstrate that, 
while there is clearly something distinctive about at least India’s participation in GG, focussing on 
power or economic interests alone is insufficient to explain that distinctiveness or its implications for 
relations between rising and traditional powers in GG.
Keywords
Emerging powers, emerging markets, United Nations Security Council, World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), United States, India
Introduction
Academic literature and the media offer a variety of monikers for emerging states like Brazil, India and 
China, most prominently, ‘emerging powers’ and ‘emerging markets’. While the first half of these 
terms—emerging—implies ambition and motion, the second half suggests the focus of that motion—
more power, a larger market (and maybe both). This paper argues the terms used to describe emerging 
states create assumptions about their behaviour in global governance (GG).
India Quarterly
71(4) 348–364
© 2015 Indian Council 






1 Post-doctoral Fellow, Technical University of Dresden, Dresden, Germany
Corresponding author:
Laura Carsten Mahrenbach, Technical University of Dresden, Dresden, Germany.
E-mail: laura.mahrenbach@tu-dresden.de
Mahrenbach 349
Emerging states are said to have two choices vis-à-vis existing GG institutions: either they will 
commit to existing institutions to maximise their own benefits or they will aim to shape institutions in 
line with their own preferences (Kahler, 2013). The latter option, reflecting the power-based focus 
implicit in ‘emerging powers’, predicts future conflict between emerging states and traditional powers; 
emerging states are unlikely to accept status quo institutional settings within GG and may even adopt the 
role of ‘spoilers’ within these institutions (Stephen, 2012). As a result, increased activism of emerging 
states in GG should correspond to less effective multilateral decision-making (Gilboy & Heginbotham, 
2013) and to a general disruption to the existing GG order (Lesage & Van de Graaf, 2015). In contrast, 
the former option, reflecting the market orientation of ‘emerging markets’, sees both emerging state and 
traditional power interests as crucially tied to GG institutions; emerging states seek ‘evolution, not revo-
lution’ (Armijo & Roberts, 2014). Consequently, they should continue to cooperate with traditional 
powers within GG as long as these institutions continue to provide the economic benefits emerging 
states—and powerful domestic actors—seek (Foot, 2006; Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007).
As is evident, the tacit assumptions in the terms used to describe emerging states have focussed 
research and media coverage in a way which, to date, has failed to generate clear, policy-relevant under-
standings of emerging state behaviour in the multilateral order. Additionally, contemporary expectations 
regarding emerging state–traditional power interaction within GG are more contradictory than coherent. 
Circumstances, thus, require new conceptual understandings not only to explain emerging state behav-
iour (Mansfield, 2014), but also to better delineate their relationships with traditional powers and 
to provide nuances regarding the implications of their ‘emergence’ for the future of GG. This paper 
combines conceptual and empirical analysis to systematically deconstruct the terms ‘emerging powers’ 
and ‘emerging markets’ as a first step in this direction.
The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, the ‘emerging’ part of emerging state monikers implies that, 
while resembling both developing countries and traditional powers, emerging states should also demon-
strate something unique in their GG behaviour which distinguishes them from both groups. Given the 
lack of explicit, contemporaneous empirical comparisons between the behaviour of emerging states and 
traditional powers in GG, this article focusses on the latter half of this transition. To what extent does 
the use of power and economic interests by emerging states in GG negotiations distinguish them from 
traditional powers? Second, the ‘power/market’ half of these terms makes clear that both power-based 
and market-based goals are important to emerging states and, what is more, interact with one another in 
numerous ways.1 Consequently, it seems necessary to understand when each goal is likely to be priori-
tised by emerging state governments. While there is ample theoretical and anecdotal exploration of this 
in the literature (Drezner, 2007; Ikenberry, 2008; Kahler, 2013), studies empirically analysing the actual 
participation of emerging states in GG within this context are rare. Can the content of GG negotiations 
predict when emerging states will prioritise power over economic interests—and vice versa—in their 
GG participation?
These questions are addressed by examining the behaviour of one emerging state, India, and one 
traditional power, the United States, in recent negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).2 Previewing the results, while the evidence supports 
the connection between the content of GG negotiations and the importance of economic interests for 
emerging states, this connection is not apparent related to power. Furthermore, the results show 
two distinct differences between emerging states and traditional powers. First, the US government was 
more likely to de-emphasise power and the Indian government to emphasise it. Second, the corpora 
of Indian and US government statements were much more similar in economic negotiations than in 
security negotiations.
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The article proceeds as follows. The next two sections present the power-based and market-based 
approaches to emerging states, deriving hypotheses from each and presenting the operationalisation 
used to assess the hypotheses in the case studies. This is followed by case studies analysing Indian and 
US participation in WTO and UNSC negotiations. Finally, the conclusion briefly discusses the academic 
and practical implications of the paper’s findings.
Competing Perspectives: Power-based Versus  
Market-based Explanations
This article employs inductive and deductive analysis to operationalise the power-based and market-
based approaches implicit in the terms ‘emerging powers’ and ‘emerging markets’. The deductive portion 
of the paper addresses the ‘power/market’ half of these appellations. At their core, the power-based 
and market-based perspectives on emerging states represent contradictory conceptual understandings of 
these states’ behaviour. Drawing on the neorealist concept of the challenger state, power-based explana-
tions treat emerging states as unitary actors which attempt to maximise their relative power position and 
capabilities vis-à-vis traditional great powers (Drezner, 2007; Ikenberry, 2008). Doing so should increase 
emerging states’ security—states’ primary concern—and simultaneously help emerging states improve 
their relative power position in the world system (Waltz, 1979). Unlike challenger states, however, 
emerging states viewed from a power-based perspective recognise the value of international institutions 
in advancing these goals. For example, Pardesi (2007) describes efforts to gain more influence within 
GG institutions, for example, by attaining a permanent seat on the UNSC, as one of the Indian govern-
ment’s major policy goals. Others see India’s participation within these organisations as facilitating 
increased Indian influence via development of issue-based alliances with key partners, as in India’s 
coalition activities at the WTO (Gratius, 2008; Narlikar, 2006). Thus, this perspective sees the increased 
activism of emerging states in GG as advancing power-based priorities, including preserving autonomy 
of action or constraining traditional powers’ influence (Hurrell, 2006). Since security is considered 
policymakers’ top priority in power-based explanations and since increasing relative power is thought 
to make emerging states more secure, officials should prioritise power considerations over all other 
considerations when security issues are at stake. Hypothesis 1 (H1) consequently claims, when GG 
negotiations focus on security issues, components of power will dominate economic interests in emerg-
ing state rhetoric.
Market-based explanations, in contrast, focus on the national rather than the international level. 
Emerging state politicians are said to respond to the preferences of domestic interest groups, which 
compete with one another to exert their influence on policymaking through lobbying (Moravcsik, 1997). 
Interest groups intensify lobbying efforts when proposed policies directly impact their economic interests 
(Schirm, 2009). Thus, emerging state governments see participation in GG as a means of ensuring strong 
economic performance and safeguarding the economic well-being of the most powerful domestic 
actors (Hirst, 2008).3 Along these lines, Kale argues that the Indian government and the Confederation 
of Indian Industry have established a ‘tight alliance’ in their mutual efforts to attract investment and 
promote trade (2009, p. 59). Likewise, Schaffer notes that in some issue areas, including trade and non-
proliferation, India’s ‘domestic policy rather than its multilateral diplomacy’ dominates the positions 
taken by the Indian government in GG (2010, p. 222). Since intensified domestic engagement is expected 
when policies directly affect interest groups, emerging state governments should prioritise influential 
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groups’ economic interests over power concerns when GG negotiations address economic issues. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) consequently claims, when GG negotiations focus on distributive questions, economic 
interests will dominate components of power in emerging state rhetoric.4
These hypotheses operationalise each understanding by connecting it with a single variable. If power-
based arguments are correct, emerging states should prioritise the components of power in GG rhetoric. 
Acknowledging the diverse definitions of power in the literature (see Barnett & Duvall, 2005), this 
article adopts a broad definition (Baldwin, 1979), arguing power encompasses a number of components—
including a state’s economic wealth—which affect hierarchical, decision-making responsibility and 
processes between actors. This study singles out three components. The first, autonomy, is defined as a 
state’s ability to pursue its goals despite limitations imposed upon it by external constraints, including 
participation in governance regimes and agreements. The second, influence, is a state’s ability to ensure 
outcomes within GG institutions reflect its preferences. This refers both to a state’s formal decision-
making power within an institution as well as to its ability to affect the behaviour of other states within 
the institution. Finally, the third, sovereignty, is defined as states’ freedom from external intervention in 
their domestic affairs, for example, via intrusive GG policies.5
In contrast, if market-based arguments are correct, emerging states should feature economic interests 
in GG rhetoric. Economic interests are economic actions which, when implemented, generate economic 
costs and benefits for private actors as a result of government decisions (Mahrenbach, 2013). Three 
components appear relevant given the scope of the UNSC and the WTO. The first, liberalisation, refers 
to gaining access to new markets or expanding access to existing markets. The second, protection, is 
defined as maintaining or decreasing given levels of market access. Finally, the third, sectoral interests, 
comprises the costs and benefits expected by individual sectors—for example, fishermen, the chemical 
industry or small- and medium-sized enterprises—resulting from GG decisions.
In real-world politics, of course, economic interests and power are often closely interlinked. The 
Economist, for example, recently noted Indian investments in regional economic infrastructure, which 
promote trade and economic growth within India and in the South Asian region, are intended to, in the 
Foreign Secretary’s words, get India’s ‘neighbourhood’ to ‘root’ for it in attempting to become a ‘leading 
power’ in the world (The Economist, 2015a). Similarly, emerging states may see increased influence 
at the WTO as a key step in improving domestic actors’ economic situation. Nonetheless, while 
acknowledging that money contributes to power and vice versa, this article will maintain the separation 
between these variables in line with previous studies (Huotari & Hanemann, 2014) to maximise analytical 
simplicity and, thereby, clarify the findings.
Turning to the ‘emerging’ half of the analysis, a deductive process seems less fruitful as only one 
approach can predict a definite relationship between emerging states and traditional powers. From a 
market-based perspective, governments should always prioritise domestic actors’ economic interests in 
GG negotiations, regardless of issue area. Consequently, the differences between emerging states and 
traditional powers—if any—should confine themselves to which interests each government chooses to 
favour based upon differing domestic interest constellations. In contrast, while power-based approaches 
would predict emerging states will highlight power in both types of negotiations to signal their intentions 
and intimidate traditional powers, it is unclear what traditional powers should do. Should they, like 
emerging states, emphasise power to underline their continued dominance over emerging states 
and thereby risk conflict? Or should they de-emphasise power in an attempt to appease emerging states 
and stabilise the status quo balance of power? Thus, this part of the analysis employs an inductive 
approach to generate some initial similarities and differences between emerging states and traditional 
powers in GG.
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Operationalisation
The case studies trace the presence of economic interests and the components of power in Indian 
government commentary during two sets of GG negotiations: the WTO mini-ministerial negotiations 
in Geneva in 2008 and the discussions concerning Libya in the UNSC in 2011. These institutional 
settings were chosen to maximise variation on the independent variables: while the WTO negotiations 
are primarily concerned with distributive questions related to potential trade liberalisation commitments, 
the UNSC negotiations focussed on the security implications of the deteriorating situation in Libya.
Why India and the United States? Power-based explanations point to factors such as economic 
and military strength or population growth as useful criteria for identifying rising powers. Although 
India’s population may be as much a burden as a benefit (The Economist, 2015b), from a power 
perspective, India’s burgeoning population, nuclear power status and booming economy—now growing 
faster than China’s—all qualify it is an emerging state. Likewise, as a functioning democracy with an increas- 
ingly active and effective civil society (Yadav, 2008), it is also a country whose policy behaviour can 
plausibly be examined using market-based assumptions. As the only emerging state fulfilling both of 
these criteria, India seems an ideal test case for H1 and H2. Similarly, the United States was chosen to 
represent the quintessential traditional power, and provides an especially strong contrast to India. Not 
only does the United States possess the permanent UNSC membership, which India has unsuccessfully 
sought for years, but its history of exclusive, bilateral decision-making with European states at the WTO 
has contributed to Indian activism during the Doha Round. Consequently, the factors evident in US 
policymaking in both cases are most likely to differ from those of India if, in fact, there is something 
unique about what motivates emerging state behaviour in GG.
For both countries, the analysis considers only statements that can be attributed to elected or 
appointed government officials. These include the heads of state, the secretaries and ministers from the 
foreign affairs, defence and economic ministries, as well as the WTO and the UN representatives. 
Government statements were collected from government websites as well as from major periodicals 
accessed through the LexisNexis database. Each corpus of statements was then analysed for the presence 
of the components of power and economic interests. In addition, they were analysed for relevant 
contextual variables. For the WTO case, these included statements referencing the negotiations 
themselves and statements addressing development, that is, special consideration for developing 
countries and their concerns as per the Doha mandate. The UNSC case controls are more diverse, includ-
ing not only comments on the negotiations but also statements referencing human rights violations 
and/or a need to protect human rights; statements referencing the appropriateness (or not) of a military 
solution; and statements calling for the establishment or strengthening of democratic political institu-
tions or processes. These contextual variables will not be addressed explicitly due to space limitations. 
However, their appearance in the results figures underlines that power and economic interests should 
impact emerging state government decisions within the context of GG negotiations and thus are 
measured only relative to one another.
WTO Mini-ministerial Meeting, July 2008
The Doha Round of trade negotiations, underway since 2001, have been marked by confrontation 
between so-called Northern and Southern states, with the primary fight centred on Southern states’ 
refusal to open non-agricultural markets and Northern states’ refusal to open agricultural markets. 
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Emerging states have been at the centre of this fight, with Brazil and India playing a particularly 
prominent role since the Cancún ministerial in 2003.
The Geneva mini-ministerial brought together ministers on 21 July 2008 for meetings intended to 
start resolving remaining issues and to outline the next steps for the Round. Issues included agreeing 
upon modalities for agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA), and concluding discussion 
of services and rules. On 23 July, the meetings moved from the Green Room and the Trade Negotiations 
Committee to an even smaller group: the G7, including the United States and India, which represented 
‘the core group of seven leading members from the developed and developing world’ (Doha Round 
Talks Sways, Shows Signs of Breakdown, 2008). Negotiations were in trouble soon thereafter as the G7, 
specifically India, failed to accept the compromise text drafted by the Director General and the negotia-
tion chairs (Blustein, 2009, p. 267). Ultimately, the negotiations failed as the United States, India and 
China failed to agree on the appropriate trigger level for a special safeguard mechanism which would 
protect developing country farmers from agricultural import surges (Lilja, 2012). Given the negotiations’ 
focus on distributive questions, this is a case in which to test H2.
India
The distribution of the variables in the Indian corpus provides compelling evidence for H2. Economic 
interests were roughly seven times more prevalent in the 159 government statements than the components 
of power. They were even more prevalent than the context variables.6 This demonstrates a clear correlation 
between the distributive character of the policies at stake and the Indian government’s prioritisation of 
economic interests over power considerations.
Turning to the statements’ content, economic interest statements were divided roughly evenly between 
those featuring liberalisation, protection and sectoral interests. Liberalisation statements emphasised the 
negative impact of trade barriers within the national and international contexts, especially related to 
agriculture and especially referencing developing countries, including India. Commerce Minister Kamal 
Nath argued, ‘Trade distorting subsidies in agriculture have to be reduced much faster than proposed 
currently’ (DoC, 2008b), and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted developed countries ‘must dis-
mantle barriers and distortions’ (MEA, 2008). In addition, liberalisation statements focussed on the need 
for a more open trading system. As Prime Minister Singh stated, ‘The world economic outlook lends 
urgency to the establishment of a just, open, reasonable and non-discriminatory international trade 
system’ (MEA, 2008).
Protectionist statements, in contrast, focussed on a need for flexibilities for developing countries in 
responding to changing trade conditions. For example, Minister Nath underlined India’s ‘right to safe-
guard livelihood concerns of hundreds of millions’, asking, ‘Are we expected to standby, see a surge in 
imports and do nothing?’ (DoC, 2008c). Similarly, he called for ‘adequate and appropriate’ flexibilities 
to address ‘the sensitivities of individual Members’ (DoC, 2008d).
Finally, sectoral interest statements focussed on the potential costs of a Doha deal, especially for 
the agriculture and automobiles sectors. Commenting on the special safeguard mechanism proposal, 
Nath stated, ‘By the time imports surged by 40 per cent, small farmers would begin to commit suicide. 
This was unacceptable to us’ (WTO Chief Lamy Visiting India to Try to Revive Trade Talks, 2008). 
Similarly, he argued against concessions which would ‘compromise India’s industries’ (Singh, 2008) or 
‘disciplines which threaten [fishermen’s] livelihoods’ (DoC, 2008e). The references to the (severe!) 
costs expected by individual domestic sectors resulting from the negotiations highlights the relevance 
of domestic actors for Indian officials. Further, the focus on costs reaffirms the calls for flexibilities and 
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infant industry protection evident in protectionist statements, suggesting protectionist groups exerted 
more influence on Indian government positions than did liberalisation supporters in this case.
Government statements featuring the components of power, in contrast, were rare. Influence state-
ments were the most prominent. These highlighted the North–South divide in the negotiations and 
insisted India’s preferences should be included within any final Doha agreement. For example, Minister 
Nath complained the NAMA draft text ‘reflected the views and ambition of only one set of developed 
countries, while almost completely disregarding the views of more than a hundred developing countries’ 
(DoC, 2008a). Similarly, he highlighted the influence India had over the Doha outcome, stating ‘there 
can be no agreement unless India agrees’ (Waltz, 2008). The two autonomy statements underlined the 
high value attributed to freedom of action by the Indian government. As Nath said, ‘India would not 
accept any constraints or restrictions on its ability to provide assistance to its poor fishermen,’ even if 
this meant the failure of the Round (DoC, 2008b).
Finally, the single statement featuring sovereignty strictly forbids external involvement in India’s 
domestic economic affairs. Nath noted India’s increased involvement in the world economy ‘doesn’t 
mean, however, that India is willing to cede control over its most sensitive sectors, including automobiles, 
auto components, textiles, and agriculture’ (Kinetz, 2008). The reference to India’s ‘most sensitive 
sectors’ indicates that, even in statements where the government underlined power as a motivating 
factor, the premises central to market-based, societal explanations were nonetheless relevant to Indian 
government actors. Specifically, although this statement aligns with neorealist assumptions about 
sovereignty as a means of preventing harm to state resources and, thus, its relative power position, the 
use of ‘sensitive’ suggests a political dimension within the Indian state which the government considered 
relevant in these negotiations.
The United States
Turning to the United States, if there is something unique about emerging state participation in GG, 
the US government should employ economic interests and the components of power differently in 
its 166 statements than the Indian government did in its own. However, the overall distribution shows 
significant similarities. Economic interests dominated both governments’ commentary, and each country 
emphasised power to a similar degree. Further, both countries emphasised influence more than the 
other components of power and all three economic interests were present in both corpora. In fact, 
the only major difference related to which economic interest each government emphasised: whereas 
Indian statements were divided evenly between the three types, US statements tilted heavily towards 
liberalisation.
Turning to content, liberalisation statements were quite similar in both countries, though the 
emphasis was different. Like Indian liberalisation statements, some US liberalisation statements 
maligned protectionist policies with President Bush, for example, noting, ‘It’s really important to 
defeat the voices of protectionism now’ (Bush, 2008b). The majority of US liberalisation statements, 
however, focussed not on a simple need for liberalisation but, rather, extolled the national and 
international benefits of free(r) trade. President Bush stated ‘I’m a free trader’ and claimed it would be 
‘disastrous for the world economy and disastrous for poor nations if we didn’t trade freely and fairly’ 
(Bush, 2008a). Similarly, US Trade Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab pointed out explicit 
benefits deriving from free trade, including the ‘hundreds of billions of dollars’ which China earns 
through trade (Schwab, 2008b) and the ‘40 per cent of our nation’s total economic growth’ which derives 
from exports (Schwab, 2008a).
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Logically, protectionist statements were rare. Like their Indian counterparts, US protectionist 
statements mostly focussed on a need for flexibilities. Schwab, for example, acknowledged a need for 
protectionist measures to ‘address legitimate needs when it comes to surges that are damaging to the 
livelihoods of subsistence farmers’ (Schwab, 2008c). Unlike Indian statements, however, US statements 
underline such measures are only appropriate in ‘exceptional situations’ and that their use should be 
‘narrowly defined’ (Schwab, 2008c).
The biggest difference between Indian and US economic interest statements appeared in the content 
of sectoral interest statements. Whereas Indian statements primarily focussed on the costs of a Doha 
deal, US statements, while acknowledging potential costs, overwhelmingly focussed on the benefits. 
Schwab claimed the US sought ‘results that will generate new opportunities for our respective exporters, 
large and small’ (Schwab, 2008e), and Bush wanted to ‘tear down regulatory barriers that hurt our busi-
nesses and consumers’ (Bush, 2008c). Also unlike India, the United States additionally underlined the 
importance of consulting with domestic actors in developing the United States’s negotiating position 
with Schwab, for example, noting the United States was ‘working closely’ with the agriculture sector 
(Schwab, 2008b). This focus on benefits and domestic consultation combined with the US’s strong 
emphasis on liberalisation suggests pro-liberalisation groups, at least, were present on US officials’ 
radar during the negotiations. Thus, although each government favoured different domestic actors, US 
economic interest statements underline the relevance of domestic groups for US government actors 
and, therefore, a similar, market-based logic to the Indian case.
Turning to the components of power, as in India, these statements were rare in the US corpus. US 
statements featured only one power component, influence, echoing the emphasis Indian government 
statements placed on influence. Here again, the content is similar between the two countries. Like 
India, the United States underlined the importance of its own influence for achieving a Doha deal: ‘The 
United States has been and remains committed to playing a leadership role in achieving a successful 
movement forward’ (Schwab, 2008c). Unlike India, however, the United States was equally likely to 
underline the need for others—especially emerging states—to assume more responsibility for the 
outcome of the Round.7 This tension in the US relationship—both emphasising and de-emphasising 
power—is encapsulated in a statement from USTR Schwab: ‘We have signalled our willingness as the 
United States to play the leadership role that we know we need to, and we look forward to China and 
other key developed and developing countries doing the same’ (Schwab, 2008d).
Results
Regarding the ‘power/market’ half of the analysis, the evidence confirmed H2: economic interests 
dominated components of power in Indian statements at the WTO. Additionally, the evidence supported 
the market-based reasoning behind H2. Government actors showed awareness of the diversity of the 
Indian economy and acknowledged their accountability to domestic groups in both economic interest 
statements and, surprisingly, some statements featuring the components of power. Interestingly, this was 
also true for the US: both countries seemed to be pursuing the interests of domestic actors. In fact, 
regarding the ‘emerging’ half of the analysis, the comparison discovered only two empirical differences: 
1) US policymakers favoured liberal groups while Indian policymakers favoured protectionist groups, 
and 2) the US negotiation strategy, in contrast to India, explicitly de-emphasised power. The results are 
summarised in Figure 1.
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UNSC Negotiations over Libya, February–March 2011
Anti-government protests began on 16 February 2011 in Benghazi with violent clashes between pro- 
testers on one hand and police and government supporters on the other. Over the next week, as protests 
spread across Libya and multiple Libyan officials resigned their posts, Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi incited his supporters to further violence (Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit, 
2011). By 22 February, both UN officials and the UNSC had called for an end to the violence, with the 
UNSC demanding ‘steps to address the legitimate demands of the population’ as well as demonstrations 
of respect for human rights (UN, 2011b). After intense discussions, the UNSC passed Resolution 1970, 
imposing sanctions on Libyan authorities. Measures included an arms embargo, a travel ban and asset 
freeze for members of Gaddafi’s administration and select relatives, as well as a referral to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) (UNSC, 2011a). India, along with the US, China and Russia, only agreed for 
adoption once the resolution text made clear that the UNSC, of which these states are members, retained 
control over determining the necessity of an investigation by the ICC, of which these states are not 
(Sharma, 2011).
The UN intensified its humanitarian efforts over the next few weeks as fighting continued. On 
11 March, the UN sent a Special Envoy to ‘undertake broad consultations with Libyan authorities on 
the immediate humanitarian, political and security situation’ and convey the international community’s 
dismay at the events in Libya (UN, 2011a). A few days later, the Arab League requested the UNSC 
impose a no-fly zone. Debate in the UNSC was heated. India was concerned about the effectiveness 
and extent of military intervention in Libya and about a lack of information regarding the situation on 
the ground. The Indian government consequently suggested the UNSC postpone any decision until they 
had received the report from the Special Envoy lest ‘negative outcomes’ result from intervention 
Figure 1. WTO Results 
Source: Author’s own.
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(MEA, 2011). The United States, in contrast, highlighted the violence against Libyan citizens, diverse 
requests for intervention, as well as the threat to democratic values posed by the current situation in 
Libya—all of which, the US claimed, demanded outside intervention (Obama, 2011b). Ultimately, the 
UNSC passed Resolution 1973 with five abstentions, including India’s. Resolution 1973 imposed 
a no-fly zone, authorised ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, reaffirmed the arms embargo 
introduced in Resolution 1970, and strengthened the resolution’s financial elements (UNSC, 2011b). 
Given the security focus of these negotiations, this is a case in which to test H1.
India
The majority of Indian government’s 64 statements referenced context variables, namely, Indian 
government opposition to a military solution and support for protecting human rights. Although the 
components of power were slightly more prevalent within the corpus than economic interests, neither 
variable dominated the other. Consequently, based on the distribution of variables, H1 finds little support. 
What about H1’s conceptual basis?
Two components of power—influence and sovereignty—were featured in Indian government 
statements. Influence statements emphasised the importance of considering a variety of countries’ views, 
including but not limited to India’s, when making decisions at the UN and UNSC. For example, 
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna noted India’s UNSC membership ‘provides us an opportunity to 
contribute to the decision making affecting peace and security […] including Libya’ (Krishna, 2011). 
Similarly, UN Representative Hardeep Puri explained India’s abstention vis-à-vis Resolution 1973, 
saying, ‘Passing a resolution is an interactive process ... if countries have doubts ... you try to remove 
them’ (India, Four Others Abstain from UN’s Libya No-Fly Zone Resolution, 2011). Statements featuring 
sovereignty emphasised the importance of allowing Libyan citizens to resolve the crisis themselves and 
consequently argued against external intervention. Puri called for ‘full respect for sovereignty, unity and 
territorial integrity of Libya’ (MEA, 2011), while Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee noted ‘no external 
powers should interfere in it [Libya]’ (India Opposes Coalition Strikes in Libya, 2011).
These statements clearly align with the power-based reasoning behind H1. For example, the sover-
eignty statements emphasise the notion of states as unitary actors (territorial integrity) as well as the 
importance of allowing each state full control over what happens within its borders as a means to increase 
stability in the region and, therefore, security. Further, the Indian government’s decision to vote for 
Resolution 1970 once its concerns about the ICC had been addressed underlines the point made in 
influence statements that the Indian government saw its national goals best protected by ensuring no 
decisions were made outside its purview. Thus, although the relative presence of the variables failed 
to validate H1, the evidence does affirm the relevance of H1’s foundations for Indian policymaking.
Economic interest statements were divided between statements featuring liberalisation and those 
featuring sectoral interests. Liberalisation statements emphasised the importance of bilateral trade 
between India and Libya, especially in relation to oil and fertilisers, and suggested trade relations may 
be hindered through UN intervention in Libya. For example, Minister Krishna noted, ‘over two-thirds 
of our oil imports’ come from the region and that India wanted to ‘secur[e] our interests in the widest 
sense of the word’ (Krishna, 2011). Statements featuring sectoral interests highlighted a desire for 
maintaining and expanding normal economic relationships within Libya and the broader Middle East, 
as well as fears that UN intervention may negatively affect Indian assets. Discussing the impact of the 
events in Libya on India’s oil supplies, for example, Minister Mukherjee stated, ‘It’s not just the price 
issue, but also the availability. I hope normalcy will be restored soon’ (Bagchi, 2011). Another statement 
referenced the impact on the ‘vital’ trade in ‘fertiliser inputs’ coming from the region (Q.822 Recent 
uprisings in Arab countries, 2011).
358  India Quarterly 71(4)
The references to oil in both types of statements featuring economic interests imply a realisation by 
the Indian government, which aligns with neorealist claims about the dangers of interrupting trade 
in ‘strategic goods’ for national security (Ripsman, 2005). However, the reference to fertilisers—vital 
imports for the 60 per cent of the Indian population working in agriculture (WTO, 2007)—as well as to 
India’s ‘4.5 million workers in the region’ (Devraj, 2011) suggests economic interest statements could 
just as easily be explained from a market-based perspective. Furthermore, while the absence of 
protectionist statements marks a strong difference from the Indian WTO results and speaks against a 
societal logic at first glance, the prominence of the liberalisation-friendly manufacturing and services 
sectors over the protectionist agriculture sector in India’s trade with the Middle East (WTO, 2011) may 
in fact reinforce this logic.
The United States
Turning to the United States, clear differences are apparent. Although, as in the Indian corpus, statements 
featuring context variables dominated the US corpus, both power and economic interests appeared sig-
nificantly less important to US officials than to their Indian counterparts. The emphasis was also differ-
ent, whereas Indian statements featured power components and interests roughly equally, US statements 
overwhelmingly de-emphasised power and featured interests in only 4 of 258 statements. Thus, these 
differences suggest some element of uniqueness about Indian participation in the UNSC negotiations.
Turning to content, although both countries featured the same power components—influence and 
sovereignty—the content differed significantly between the two countries. Like Indian influence state-
ments, some US statements focussed on the importance of including many states’ voices in UNSC 
decisions. President Barack Obama, for example, stated ‘American leadership is essential, but that does 
not mean acting alone—it means shaping the conditions for the international community to act together’ 
(Obama, 2011b). Most, however, singled out the US’s unique responsibility for world security. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton described the UN mission in Libya as a ‘mission that the United States, of 
course, was going to be in the forefront of because of our unique capabilities’ (Clinton & Gates, 2011). 
Similarly, US sovereignty statements appeared more focussed on the moral and practical implications of 
intervening in Libya’s transformation than, like India, on the appropriateness of external intervention. 
As Clinton noted, the United States ‘cannot and must not attempt to impose our will on the people of 
Libya’ (Clinton, 2011c).
Furthermore, to an even greater degree than in the WTO case and in stark contrast to India, US state-
ments de-emphasised the importance of power in the negotiations. De-emphasising influence, President 
Obama was specific about the limited nature of the US’s role in the UN-led operations: the US ‘would 
not put ground troops into Libya […] would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the 
operation and […] would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners’ (Obama, 2011a). Similarly, 
de-emphasising autonomy, Obama detailed the restrictions placed by Resolution 1973 on Gaddafi and 
underlined the importance of enforcing it lest ‘the writ of the United Nations Security Council’ appear 
‘little more than empty words, crippling that institution’s future credibility to uphold global peace 
and security’ (Obama, 2011a). Finally, de-emphasising sovereignty, many US statements appeared 
to take international intervention in Libyan domestic affairs for granted. Clinton, for example, called 
for a ‘unified front of political and diplomatic pressure that makes clear to Gaddafi he must go’ 
(Clinton, 2011c).
Turning to economic interests, differences are again apparent. Unlike Indian liberalisation statements, 
the single US liberalisation statement focussed not on the benefits of bilateral trade but on support for 
freer markets. Clinton stated, ‘Americans understand the need for responsible investments in our security 
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for the future to make us safer, to keep markets open’ (Clinton, 2011b). The two US sectoral interests 
statements underlined the benefits ‘taxpayers’ could expect from US involvement in the UN intervention—
saving ‘a great deal of money’ (Clinton, 2011b)—and minimised the costs the defence industry expected 
from the UN’s ‘suspension of the very limited defence trade we have had with Libya’ (Clinton, 2011a). 
In other words, as in the WTO case, US sectoral interest statements primarily focussed on the benefits, 
not the costs, of GG decisions. The decision to juxtapose attention to the interests of the US’s strong 
defence sector lobby with voters’ sensitivity to cost following the recent financial crisis underlines the 
logic of the market-based approach here.
Results
Regarding the ‘power/market’ portion of the case study, H1 found little empirical support. Not only did 
the components of power fail to dominate economic interests in the Indian corpus, but the corpus 
evidenced a foreign policy compatible with either market-based or power-based logic. This is surprising. 
After all, the joint abstention of the BRIC states from the vote on Resolution 1973 suggested the 
abstention was politically motivated and, consequently, meant to be a statement about their rising power 
and the need to grant them more responsibility within the UNSC. Regarding the ‘emerging’ portion, 
however, the evidence shows strong differences in both the distribution and content of statements 
featuring economic interests and the components of power. Furthermore, unlike the Indian corpus, the 
US corpus provided limited evidence linking it to either theoretical tradition. Consequently, it appears 
there is some evidence for the uniqueness of Indian behaviour in global security negotiations. The results 
are summarised in Figure 2.
Figure 2. UNSC Results
Source: Author’s own.
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Conclusion
This article has argued that the terms used to describe emerging states like India, Brazil and China 
have implications for how their motivations and behaviour in GG are understood. Pushing beyond 
these assumptions, this article has combined inductive and deductive approaches to systematically 
deconstruct these terms. Specifically, this article asks two questions, as yet under-explored in the 
literature. First, regarding the ‘emerging’ half of these terms, to what extent does the use of power 
and economic interests in emerging state rhetoric distinguish their participation in GG from that of 
traditional powers? Second, regarding the ‘power/market’ half, can the content of GG negotiations 
predict whether emerging states will prioritise power or economic interests in their GG rhetoric? Initial 
answers were provided by tracing the presence of the components of power and economic interests in 
the positions taken by Indian and US officials in WTO and UNSC negotiations.
Two clear differences were evident between emerging state and traditional power approaches to 
GG in the inductive portion of the article. First, emerging state and traditional power rhetoric was much 
more similar in the WTO than in the UNSC. In the WTO, both the United States and India favoured 
economic interests over context variables and the components of power in their statements. Additionally, 
for both states, a market-based explanatory logic was supported by the evidence. In contrast, in the 
UNSC case, India was much more likely than the United States to emphasise both economic interests 
and power, and there was a clear mismatch between the market-based and power-based logic(s) evident 
in the two corpora. This finding suggests the ‘emerging’ versus ‘traditional power’ distinction may be 
more relevant in global security governance than in global economic governance. This is plausible. 
After all, emerging states most recently came to the world’s notice because of remarkable economic 
growth rates and high-profile activities in global economic governance institutions. This distinction 
between global economic and security governance is also underlined by the second difference between 
India and the United States: US officials de-emphasised power in both GG negotiations, while India did 
so in neither. This distinction was especially pronounced in the UNSC case. This suggests that, even 
though the content of GG negotiations may not necessarily predict how important power is to emerging 
states within those negotiations, it may predict the relative importance of power for relations between 
emerging states and traditional powers within GG.
These findings have practical implications for the future of existing GG negotiations. First, the 
clear similarities between Indian and US participation in the WTO negotiations suggest common, domes-
tic political pressures which, if acknowledged openly, may be able to enhance cooperation between 
emerging states and traditional powers in global economic governance. This was evident, for example, 
in the November 2014 bilateral deal between India and the United States, which enabled the implemen-
tation of the WTO’s Bali Agreement. Second, the avoidance of power in US rhetoric and the emphasis 
on power in Indian rhetoric reaffirms claims in the literature (Cooper, 2015; Vestergaard & Wade, 2015) 
that these types of states have contrasting agendas when it comes to GG reform. While some changes 
(e.g., the creation of the new Quad at the WTO) have been made to accommodate emerging state reform 
preferences in global economic governance, the apparatus of global security governance, particularly 
the UNSC, remains trapped in the 1940s. Furthermore, symbolic gestures, such as President Obama’s 
2010 declaration of support for India’s aspiration to a permanent UNSC seat, appear insufficient to 
minimise the impact of power concerns on emerging state–traditional power participation in security 
negotiations.
Turning to the deductive portion of the article, the evidence in the WTO case study confirmed H2: 
economic interests dominated the components of power in global trade negotiations, which focussed on 
distributive questions. Furthermore, the market-based logic behind H2 was also confirmed empirically. 
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The UNSC case study, in contrast, failed to confirm H1: power was only slightly more prominent in 
Indian government rhetoric than economic interests in the security-focussed negotiations over Libya. 
In addition, the evidence provided some support for both approaches to emerging states. Here, the 
implications are primarily academic: deconstructing ‘emerging powers’ and ‘emerging markets’ 
shows that additional research systematically examining the relationship between power and economic 
interests seems the most fruitful way of understanding today’s emerging states, their participation in 
GG, and the implications of their emergence for today’s GG institutions.
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Notes
1. Some authors argue economic achievements facilitate power-based ones (Hurrell, 2006; Ikenberry, 2008); 
others argue the reverse (Landsberg, 2006); and yet others set these goals parallel (Nel & Stephen, 2010).
2. Clearly neither of these states can adequately represent the diversity of emerging states or traditional powers 
on their own. This article seeks only to provide a first look at relations between emerging states and traditional 
powers and at emerging state behaviour in GG. (Significantly) more research is necessary!
3. In emerging state democracies, such as India or Brazil, growing civil society participation in policymaking 
means powerful economic actors tend to be represented by interest groups. In contrast, in non-democratic 
emerging states, such as China, powerful domestic actors may be represented differently, for example, by 
competing factions within the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, the operationalisation used in this article is 
transferrable to other democratic emerging states as is but must be adapted to be applicable to non-democratic 
emerging states.
4. Though seemingly self-explanatory, the hypotheses are less so when considered from the opposing perspective. 
Power-based perspectives would expect emerging states to highlight power in negotiations with traditional 
powers regardless of issue area, since doing so should most efficiently promote emerging states’ own power 
aspirations. Market-based perspectives, in contrast, may see domestic economic interests at the heart of even 
security-based decisions, interpreting official security objectives as politically palatable covers for domestic 
actors’ interests.
5. Sovereignty and autonomy may sound similar at first. They differ in that sovereignty refers to who can make or 
change domestic policies. In contrast, autonomy focusses on who can restrict state behaviour or decisions.
6. A figure illustrating the distribution of the variables in each corpus appears at the end of each case study.
7. These statements fell outside the coding rules for ‘influence’ and consequently appear under ‘anti-power’ in 
Figures 1 and 2.
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